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SUGGESTIONS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
IN SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION
Lanny A. Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission must consider many
complex market structure issues in the months and years to come, including
overseeing the consolidation of self-regulators,1 regulating cross-border
activities of exchange markets,2 creating a new paradigm for short sale
regulation,3 establishing clear guidelines for exchange ownership and
governance,4 and acting on perennial calls for reforming market data
revenue distribution.5 Whatever the SEC does in these areas, it will affect
investor protection, the national economy, and the international position of
markets and market participants. For each issue, the SEC will have to
decide how much to intervene to promote specific policy goals, and how
much to let the forces of competition dictate the shape of the solution.
The SEC’s calculus concerning the role of competition is, to a
significant degree, dictated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act).6 In designing the statutory framework for a national
market system in the United States, Congress recognized that free and fair
competition is essential to the achievement of preserving our securities

* Counsel, Davis Polk & Wardwell. The author wishes to acknowledge, with gratitude, the
assistance of Vijay Dewan of Notre Dame Law School, Joel Emans of Davis Polk & Wardwell,
and Nihal Patel of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.
1. See, e.g., Press Release, NASD Member Firms Embrace Streamlined, More Efficient
Regulation (Jan. 21, 2007), available at http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007
NewsReleases/NASDW_018334.
2. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at Harvard Business School Global
Leadership Forum: Cross-Border Exchange Mergers in the Context of Global Trade (June 22,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch062206cc.htm; Roel C. Campos,
Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at NYU Stern: New Challenges in Regulating Financial Markets (Mar.
24, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032406rcc.htm.
3. See Exchange Act Release No. 54,891, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,068 (Dec. 13, 2006).
4. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act
Release No. 50,699, 84 SEC Docket 444 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004). Since the time of this proposal,
not only has the New York Stock Exchange combined with Archipelago and the former Pacific
Exchange, but many “regional exchanges” have formed alliances, including equity participation,
with member organizations and other investors. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Plays the
Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at C1.
5. See, e.g., Regulation NMS and Recent Market Developments: Hearing before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Mark E. Lackritz,
President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n); Annette L. Nazareth, Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation, SEC, Opening
Statement before the Open Meeting regarding Regulation NMS (Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040605aln.htm.
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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markets as a precious national resource.7 When crafting the 1975
Amendments to the federal securities laws, Congress extensively debated
the role of competition in shaping market structure.8 There was concern that
there might be areas in which competition would not act to create essential
infrastructure for the markets and that regulation was therefore necessary to
achieve Congress’s goals.9 However, the legislators were equally mindful
that unnecessary regulation not impede market forces in shaping market
structure,10 and that the markets and their broker-dealer participants “not be
forced into a single mold.”11 In the end, the amendments to the Exchange
Act that flowed from those debates established a system that both promotes
and significantly constrains competition between and among markets and
market participants.12
The statute vests the SEC with extensive authority to influence market
structure. Indeed, in certain respects, under the Exchange Act it is not
enough for the SEC to merely fill in gaps left by competitive forces or
correct the course of natural market development. Rather, the statute
commands the SEC to be an activist regulator and to take affirmative action
to achieve certain specific market structure objectives.13 The SEC exercises
this authority both in its formal actions, such as rulemaking and review of

7. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C) (2000) (“It is in the
public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and
orderly markets to assure . . . fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange
markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets . . . .”); S. REP.
NO. 94-75, at 8 (1975) (“The objective would be to enhance competition and to allow economic
forces, interacting within a fair regulatory field, to arrive at appropriate variations of practices and
services.”).
8. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 92 (1975).
10. See id.
11. See S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 8 (1975). Congress also observed in the Senate Report that:
In 1936, this Committee [on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs] pointed out that a
major responsibility of the SEC in the administration of the securities laws is to “create
a fair field of competition.” This responsibility continues today. . . . The objective
would be to enhance competition and to allow economic forces, interacting within a fair
regulatory field, to arrive at appropriate variations in practices and services. It would
obviously be contrary to this purpose to compel elimination of differences between
types of markets or types of firms that might be competition enhancing.
Id. For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of section 11A, see Dale Oesterle, Regulation
NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded its Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a National Market System
in Securities Trading, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 613 (2005).
12. As discussed in Part II.C., infra, to the extent that Congress and SEC actions under the
securities laws have not operated to explicitly displace them, other areas of law, including antitrust
law and state law, also affect competitive activity in the securities markets and, therefore, market
structure.
13. See, e.g., Exchange Act §§ 11A(a)(2), (c)(1)(A)–(F), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2), (c)(1)
(A)-(F).
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self-regulatory organization (SRO) rules,14 and also in its inspection,
examination, enforcement, and other actions.15 Indeed, in many instances,
the SEC’s power, even its inaction, significantly affects and shapes market
structure and the landscape for competition.
In general, the Exchange Act’s delegation of authority to a highly
empowered expert body, such as the SEC, and the directions given to the
SEC in the statute to weigh competitive effects against investor protection,
maintenance of fair and orderly markets, capital formation and other policy
considerations when shaping market structure, were choices and have
worked reasonably well.16 In the last decade alone, the SEC has
implemented many successful market structure initiatives, which have
proven the SEC’s ability to advance the Exchange Act’s policy objectives
without squelching competition.17
Nonetheless, certain procedures outlined in the Exchange Act, as
administered by the SEC, operate to impose effective restraints on
innovation and other potentially salutary attributes of competition that may
not be fully justified by countervailing policies. The present structure
results in slow, conservative and opaque decision making. This paper
examines certain procedural aspects of the SEC’s role in shaping market
structure and regulating competition under the Exchange Act—and, in
particular, the SEC’s regulation of securities exchanges, the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), and other self-regulatory
organizations.
Why does the procedure matter? First, securities markets compete with
each other and establish the modalities by which their members can
compete by establishing trading rules, introducing systems, and charging
fees or otherwise affecting the cost of doing business. Each of these must be
filed as a proposed rule change. Therefore, the SRO rule change process is
the “critical path” of much new competition and in many instances the
source of developments in market structure. Second, the clearer the
Commission’s processes for establishing and enforcing legal standards that
impact the market are, the more possible it is for market participants to plan

14. See, e.g., SEC, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS,
MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION, http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate].
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 3(f), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78c(f) (LexisNexis 2006); Exchange Act
§ 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78w(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2006); Exchange Act § 11A.
17. Naturally, each of these undertakings has had its detractors. In each major initiative, many
commentators have argued that the SEC has either (a) gone too far in seeking to achieve through
regulation what the forces of free competition would have handled just fine without government
intervention, or (b) exceeded its statutory mandate. The SEC’s proposal to adopt Regulation NMS
alone attracted over 1500 comment letters—many addressing these precise issues. See Regulation
NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,498 (June 29, 2005).
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new initiatives and to attract capital for them. Thus, if the procedure does
not work well, is too plodding, lacks transparency, or stifles innovation,
then investors are denied freedom of choice with respect to many possible
products, international competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions is
hampered, and an appetite for “regulatory risk” becomes a key determinant
of competitive advantage.18
This paper suggests a number of possible procedural reforms that
might, if adopted, alleviate to some degree these concerns. Specifically, the
SEC should:
•

•

•

Establish new standards of conduct for market participants through
the rulemaking process, rather than through informal staff policy
determinations, examinations and inspections, and enforcement
actions;
Update the procedures for approval of SRO rule proposals in order
to make more types of proposals eligible for “effective on filing” or
other expedited processing in order to preserve valuable staff
resources for proposals that truly raise competitive and investor
protection issues;
Establish by regulation (or request that Congress, through an
amendment to section 19 of the Exchange Act, impose) a time limit
for publishing SRO rule filings for public comment;

18. Of course, there is no blinding new insight here. The SEC and others have long been
cognizant of this connection between procedure and competitive burden. Moreover, the
Commission has successively (and often very productively) endeavored to address unnecessary
procedural burdens. See, e.g., Filings by Self-Regulatory Organizations of Proposed Rule Changes
and Other Materials with the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 15,838, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,924 (May 29, 1979); Filings by Self-Regulatory Organizations of Proposed Rule Changes and
Other Materials with the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 17,258, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,906
(Nov. 7, 1980); Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations: Annual Filing of
Amendments to Registration Statements of National Securities Exchanges, Securities
Associations, and Reports of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Exchange Act Release
No. 34,140, 59 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (proposed June 1, 1994); Proposed Rule Changes of SelfRegulatory Organizations: Annual Filing of Amendments to Registration Statements of National
Securities Exchanges, Securities Associations, and Reports of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, Exchange Act Release No. 35,123, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,692 (Dec. 20, 1994);
Proposed Amendment to Rule 19b-4, Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
Release No. 39,885, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,584 (proposed Apr. 29, 1998); Amendment to Rule Filing
Requirements for Self-Regulatory Organizations Regarding New Derivative Securities Products,
Exchange Act Release No. 40,761, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,952 (Dec. 22, 1998); Proposed Rule Changes
of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 43,860, 66 Fed. Reg. 8912
(proposed Feb. 5, 2001); DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF
CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS, Study I, at 10 (Jan. 1994), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/market2000.pdf [hereinafter Market 2000]. See also U.S.
GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES,
REP. NO. GAO-02-302, at 10–11 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d02302.pdf [hereinafter SEC OPERATIONS].
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•

Liberalize the use of no-action letters and exemptive relief in areas
with a competitive impact, including new products and proposals—
perhaps using more readily “generic” no-action letters, which can
be relied upon by many industry participants, rather than just the
applicant, and using temporary or pilot approvals to enable the
Commission staff to study the impact of the approvals; and
• Explicitly seek to permit cross-border products and services where
access to such products and services is not prohibited by law. In
this regard, the SEC (or Congress) should develop a framework for
weighing international competition and cross-border access in
rulemaking and other official action.
In order to give context to these suggestions, Part II of this article
describes the overall framework for market structure regulation utilized by
the Exchange Act. The operation of the regulatory regime is evaluated in
Part III of the article, which examines the strengths and weaknesses of the
regulatory scheme. Part IV of the article contains a detailed discussion of
the author’s proposals for procedural reform.
II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR MARKET STRUCTURE
REGULATION
A. THE CONUNDRUM OF COMPETITION
The Exchange Act creates a dual system of securities market regulation.
National securities exchanges, national securities associations, and other
entities that function as SROs regulate their members and (if they operate
markets) act as market regulators.19 The SEC acts as an oversight regulator
of the SROs, and it also promulgates its own rules and regulations and
exercises enforcement authority over markets and market participants.20 In
addition, the SEC has extensive rulemaking authority to implement the
Exchange Act’s directives.21
Among the key areas that the Exchange Act directs the SEC and
(somewhat indirectly) the SROs to consider when establishing rules is
competition. Under the statute, the SEC is obliged (a) not to unnecessarily
burden competition (or permit SROs subject to its purview to do so)22 and
(b) to promote fair and orderly markets by assuring, among other things,

19. See generally Concept Release: Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No.
38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (June 4, 1997) (discussing the system of self-regulation).
20. See generally The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
21. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 6(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000); Exchange Act § 19(b)(5)(ii),
15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000); Exchange Act § 3(f), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78c (LexisNexis 2006); Exchange Act
§ 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78w (2000).
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“fair competition” among and between market participants.23 To understand
the framework established by the Exchange Act in this area, and how it is
administered in practice, it is helpful to observe that in designing a template
for competition regulation, Congress essentially needed to reconcile several
propositions that might appear on the surface to be mutually inconsistent:
Vigorous competition can be good. Competition can be an engine for
innovation, which often benefits investors, such as when it spurs new
technologies and trading methodologies.24 Moreover, in the context of
securities trading, competition, when coupled with price transparency and
accessibility of trading interest, can result in economically efficient pricing
mechanisms for investors and traders.25
Collaboration among competitors can be good and even necessary.
Collaboration among competitors is a cardinal element of U.S. securities
markets. Brokers and dealers participate jointly in the governance of
securities exchanges, band together to form underwriting syndicates, agree
upon the parameters for establishing opening prices for a market and
respond collectively to a floor broker’s request for a single price execution
or resolving trading disputes. Securities markets also collaborate
extensively to collect and disseminate consolidated quotation and last sale
information,26 develop and govern inter-market linkages,27 allocate
regulatory responsibilities for common members,28 and coordinate

23. See Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2000).
24. See, e.g., Reviewing U.S. Capital Market Structure—The New York Stock Exchange and
Related Issues: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government
Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of
Meyer “Sandy” Frucher, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Philadelphia Stock Exchange),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/101603ml.pdf [hereinafter Reviewing
U.S. Capital Market Structure].
25. See., e.g., Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S. Atkins, Comm’rs, SEC, Dissent of
Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins to the Adoption of Regulation NMS 29
(June 9, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808-dissent.pdf [hereinafter
Regulation NMS Dissent].
26. See OPRA, PLAN FOR REPORTING OF CONSOLIDATED OPTIONS LAST SALE REPORTS AND
QUOTATION INFORMATION (Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://www.opradata.com/pdf/opra_
plan.pdf; NYSE, Inc., Consolidated Tape Association Plan (Second Restatement) (June 16, 2006)
(CTA Plan); NYSE, Inc., Consolidated Quotation Plan (Restatement) (June 16, 2006) (CQ Plan).
Both the CTA Plan and the CQ Plan are available at http://www.nysedata.com/cta.
27. See PLAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING AND OPERATING AN INTERMARKET
COMMUNICATIONS LINKAGE PURSUANT TO § 11A(3)(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 (2006), available at http://www.itsplan.com (follow “ITS Plan (pdf)” link); Order Approving
Options Intermarket Linkage Plan Submitted by the American Stock Exchange LLC, Chicago
Board Options Exchange, Inc., and International Securities Exchange LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 43,086, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,023 (Aug. 4, 2000).
28. See Exchange Act § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2000); Exchange Act § 17(d), 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 78q(d) (LexisNexis 2006). For a discussion of allocation of regulatory responsibilities by SROs,
see Program for Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities Pursuant to Rule 17d-2, Exchange Act
Release No. 54,136, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,759 (July 18, 2006).
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surveillance efforts.29 Without these numerous forms of collaboration
among competitors that are directed by the Exchange Act or sanctioned by
administrative action, we would not have many of the structures that we
take for granted such as: firm quotes by dealers in the equities and options
markets; a system of transparent consolidated quotations and last sale
information; required display of most limit orders in equities and options;
inter-market linkages (and inter-market order protection) in the equities and
options markets; and orderly processes for clearance and settlement. Rather,
we would have fragmented markets and trading, and non-uniform, nonfungible products without true transparency or inter-market competition.
Thus, collaboration in some areas has created ground rules for fair
competition that operate in the public interest.
Defining competition in the context of the securities markets is
maddeningly complex. Even the definition of competition in the securities
business is tricky because exchanges can compete with broker-dealers (and
vice-versa)30 and investors can compete with broker-dealers.31 Apparently,
many at the SEC believe that the proper type of competition to promote is
not competition between market participants, so much as competition
among orders.32 In addition, the competing interests of “short-term” and
“long-term” investors were a significant element in the policy debate
concerning the adoption of Regulation NMS.33 Exchange markets in
29. See Amendment to Rule Filing Requirements for Self-Regulatory Organizations
Regarding New Derivative Securities Products, Exchange Act Release No. 40,761, 63 Fed. Reg.
70,952, 70,959 (Dec. 22, 1998), for a discussion of Intermarket Surveillance Group. See also
Request for Comment on Nasdaq Petition Relating to the Regulation of Nasdaq-Listed Securities,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,849, 68 Fed. Reg. 27,722, 27,723 (May 20, 2003).
30. See, e.g., Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act
Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,910 (Dec. 22, 1998); see also Domestic Sec., Inc. v.
SEC, 333 F.3d 239, 243–44 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Firms Plan New
Service for Block Trades, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at C4.
31. See, e.g., Notice of Filing of Amendments No. 2, 3, and 4 to Proposed Rule Change to
Modify the Information Contained in a Directed Order on the Boston Options Exchange,
Exchange Act Release No. 53,357, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,730, 10,730–32 (Mar. 2, 2006); Letter from
Adam C. Cooper, Senior Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Citadel Inv. Group, LLC, to Nancy
Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/bse/
bse200552.shtml; Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule
Change to Establish a Fee Per Contract Traded for Improvement Orders Submitted Into a Price
Improvement Period by a Public Customer That Are not Submitted as Customer PIP Orders,
Exchange Act Release No. 54,328, 71 Fed. Reg. 49,493 (Aug. 23, 2006); Letter from Adam C.
Cooper, Senior Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Citadel Inv. Group, LLC, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y,
SEC (June 17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bse-2006-10/bse2006101.pdf; see also Proposed Rule Change by International Securities Exchange, Concerning
Professional Account Holders, SR-ISE-2006-26 (May 5, 2006), available at
http://www.iseoptions.com/legal/pdf/proposed_rule_changes/SR-ISE-2006-26$Professional_
AccountHolders$20060505.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496,
37,498 (June 29, 2005).
33. See Regulation NMS Dissent, supra note 25, at 24–27.
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equities, options, and derivatives compete with over-the-counter markets.34
The extent to which international and cross-border issues should be
considered by the SEC in evaluating competitive impacts of various
initiatives is a question that has been raised repeatedly, but has not been
fully developed in Exchange Act jurisprudence.35 Therefore, the regulation
of competition cannot be limited to focusing on specified “categories” of
market participants and their competitive relations with one another.
Empowering competitors to establish standards, systems and rules is
risky. Self-regulation has its benefits—particularly placing front line
regulation in the hands of the people who best understand the business and
also requiring industry participants to bear a large part of the cost of
regulating themselves.36 However, Congress well understood that, absent a
proper system of oversight, the SRO structure would not be sound (though
it took some years for an effective statutory oversight structure to be
established).37 For example, without oversight there would be continuous
concerns that SROs would use their power to levy fees and impose
discipline on members to benefit some members but not others, exchange
systems would be designed to promote the interests of certain traders but
not others (and certainly not investors), and standards would be developed
(such as fixed commission schedules) that would discourage competition.38
To ensure that the SROs do not use their statutory authority to the detriment
of investors and the marketplace, and to ensure a proper balance of
competition-related concerns and other policy objectives, the Exchange Act
imposes several key controls, including: prescribing certain minimum
standards for the content of SRO rules;39 requiring significant policies and
procedures of SROs (including systems and fees) to be filed with and (in
34. See, e.g., Amendment to Rule Filing Requirements for Self-Regulatory Organizations
Regarding New Derivative Securities Products, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70,965 (adopting Exchange Act
Rule 19b-4(e)); Examining the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 and Recent Market
Developments: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
2 (2005) (testimony of the Sec. Indus. Ass’n), available at http://www.sia.com/testimony/
2005/mlackritz09-08-05.html [hereinafter Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
Hearing, SIA Testimony].
35. See, e.g., Letter from Jayda Dagdelen & Mara Tchalakov, Senior Task Force Comm’rs,
Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC
(Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004/s71004-587.pdf.
36. See generally Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV.
475 (1984).
37. See generally id. at 480–87, for a history of self-regulation in the securities industry.
38. See, e.g., Proposal to Adopt Securities Exchange Act Rule 19g2-1 to Relieve National
Securities Exchanges and Registered Securities Associations from Certain Obligations, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,483, 9 SEC Docket 731 (May 26, 1976); Enforcement Obligations of
Exchanges and Associations, Exchange Act Release No. 12,994, 10 SEC Docket 998 (Nov. 18,
1976).
39. See Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000); Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(2000); Exchange Act § 17A, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (Supp. II 2002).
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most cases) approved by the SEC;40 specifying procedures and standards for
SEC review and approval of SRO rules and proposed rule changes;41
imposing upon SROs a general legal obligation to enforce their rules and
the federal securities laws;42 conferring upon the SEC oversight and
enforcement authority respecting SROs;43 providing for a mechanism of
appeal from certain SRO actions;44 and establishing a mechanism for the
SEC to amend SRO rules directly on its own initiative.45
Promotion of competition is but one policy objective. In order to be
effective, a system of market regulation must take into account various
alternative policy objectives—such as protecting investors and ensuring that
there is adequate infrastructure for market operations and securities
trading—that, in some cases, might point away from free competition.46
The operation of the Exchange Act in balancing these various
considerations is briefly described in Section II.B, which follows
immediately below. There are several points to note, however, in assessing
the operations of this structure. First, the system is set up to ensure that
certain formal actions of the SEC are required to be informed by particular
policy objective, but not necessarily other actions. Second, in some cases,
but not others, the marketplace is informed of the SEC’s analysis and has an
opportunity to comment upon it. Third, because of the procedures
associated with SRO rule approval, the SEC can effectively exercise a
“pocket veto” over potentially innovative and pro-competitive rule
proposals. This allows the SEC to substantively influence rule proposals
without subjecting the proposals to notice and public comment or
explaining its rationale for doing so. Fourth, when the SEC does make rules
and take other official actions, it is, to some extent, constrained by the
policy guidance explicitly stated in the Exchange Act. Thus, the SEC is
compelled to weigh certain policy objectives above others, which may be
equally valid, or even more compelling, under the circumstances. The
implications of these four points in evaluating the effectiveness of the
system and determining if it strikes the proper balance in terms of allowing
competitive forces—not regulatory mandates—shape market structure are
discussed in Section IV, below.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000).
See id.
See Exchange Act § 19(g).
See Exchange Act § 19(h).
See Exchange Act § 19(d), (f).
See Exchange Act § 19(c).
See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95,
pt. 4, at 502–05, 576–79 (1963).
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B. STATUTORY DIRECTIVES
1. Content of SRO Rules
In determining whether to allow an organization to register as a national
securities exchange or a registered securities association, the SEC must
determine whether the organization’s rules meet certain specified standards.
Among these are the criteria contained in sections 6(b)(8) (dealing with
national securities exchanges) and 15A(b)(9) (dealing with registered
securities associations) of the Exchange Act, which direct the SEC to
ensure that the rules of the exchange or association “do not impose any
burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of” the Act. The Exchange Act also provides that the rules of the
exchange or association must provide for the equitable allocation of
reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its members and issuers and
other persons using its facilities, and be:
[D]esigned to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest; and are not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, or to
regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this title matters not
related to the purposes of this title or the administration of the exchange.47

2. SEC Consideration and Approval of SRO Rules
Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act requires each SRO to file with the
SEC any proposed rule or rule change, accompanied with a statement of the
basis and purpose of the proposal. Such rules and rule proposals must be
approved by the SEC in order to take effect,48 unless the proposal falls
within a list of prescribed categories that are “effective upon filing.”49 The
SEC must publish notice of the proposal and give the public an opportunity
to comment on it. Generally the comment period for a proposed rule change
is twenty-one days, and comments often focus on competition issues.

47. Exchange Act § 6(b)(4), (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(4), (5) (2000); see also Exchange Act
§ 15(a)(b)(5), (6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(b)(5), (6) (Supp. II 2002).
48. See Exchange Act § 19(b)(2).
49. See Exchange Act § 19(b)(3)(A), which provides that proposed SRO rules constituting a
stated policy, practice, or interpretation regarding the meaning, administration, or enforcement of
an existing rule, establishing or changing a due, fee, or other charge, or concerned solely with the
administration of the self-regulatory organization are not the subject to SEC approval order, but
are “effective on filing.” See also Exchange Act Rule 19b-4(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(f) (2004).
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According to section 19(b)(2), the SEC may only approve a proposed rule
or rule change if it finds that the proposal is consistent with requirements of
the Exchange Act.50 For example, the SEC must determine whether the rule
would impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The SEC must also consider the
protection of investors and “whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”51 Thus, the SEC is required to engage
in a balancing of various factors along with competition.
In analyzing the effects of SRO proposals on competition, the SEC has
observed that it “is not required to achieve its objectives in the least
anticompetitive manner and is at most required to decide that any
anticompetitive effects of its actions are necessary or appropriate to the
achievement of its objectives.”52 In a matter involving the rules of a
registered clearing organization (a type of SRO) the SEC stated that in
assessing the anticompetitive effects of the proposed rules, the SEC “is
required to balance the maintenance of fair competition with a number of
other equally important express purposes of the Act such as the protection
of investors and the safeguarding of securities and funds.”53 For example, in
acting upon the application of the clearing organization to largely withdraw
from the clearance and settlement of equity securities, the SEC effectively
approved a monopoly on clearing of equity securities in the United States.
The SEC observed that, despite the dominant market position of certain
clearing organizations, the regulatory structure and nature of the depository
industries were sufficient to avoid the negative effects of a monopoly, and
therefore the proposed rules were not “an inappropriate or unnecessary
burden upon competition.”54
Although the Exchange Act contains many directives to the SEC
concerning consideration of the implications of its actions on competition, it
gives little guidance concerning how to analyze competition issues. As a
result, the Commissioners and the staff are left to consider, with respect to
each action, which type or measure of competition is the most significant.
In rulemaking, the Commission generally explains its competitive impact
analysis in detail and backs up that analysis with empirical data. Often, the
Commission is flooded with adverse comment on its rulemaking proposals

50. See Exchange Act § 19(b)(2).
51. See Exchange Act § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2000).
52. Order Granting Partial Permanent Approval and Partial Temporary Approval of Proposed
Rule Changes Relating to a Decision by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 39,444, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,703, 66,705 (Dec. 19, 1997); Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp.
v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
53. Order Granting Partial Permanent Approval, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,705.
54. Id.

420

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 1

urging it to adopt different approaches to its competition analysis.55
However, by contrast, approvals of SRO rule changes generally do not
contain extensive analysis of competitive impacts. Generally, statements
regarding competition are conclusory and are rarely backed by extensive
data.
Where the SEC is uncertain regarding the possible effects of a
particular SRO rule, it frequently approves the rule on a temporary or
“pilot” basis. In such cases, the SEC often requires the SRO to submit data
regarding the effects of the rule so that it can evaluate whether the rule
complies with statutory standards and should be approved on a permanent
basis.56
Many SRO rules become effective by an SEC-issued order. Like other
final orders of the Commission, aggrieved persons may request that such
orders be reviewed by a federal court of appeals.57
In regard to filings that are “effective upon filing,” there is no
Commission approval order issued. However, the SEC may “abrogate” the
filing, cause it to be refiled in the “ordinary way” (i.e., under section
19(b)(2)), and subject it to full notice and public comment and SEC review
if the Commission believes that such action is necessary to protect investors
or to further the purposes of the Exchange Act. In practice, the SEC
abrogates “effective upon filing” SRO rule changes where the SEC
considers that the proposal raises significant policy issues that should be

55. See, e.g., Reviewing U.S. Capital Market Structure, supra note 24. Interestingly, a former
SEC Chairman and a former Secretary of the Commission have both recently called for greater
economist involvement in policy setting at the SEC. See Harvey Pitt, Over-Lawyered at the SEC,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006, at A15; Jonathan G. Katz, Rules Are Not Sacred, Principles Are,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2006, at A11.
56. See, e.g., Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1 by the International
Securities Exchange LLC Relating to Market Maker Allocations, Exchange Act Release No.
42,808, 65 Fed. Reg. 34,515, 34,517 (May 30, 2000) (“The Commission . . . intends to use the
one-year pilot period to monitor the rule’s impact on competition.”); Order Granting Accelerated
Approval to the Proposed Rule Change on a Temporary Basis Relating to Bond Mutual Fund
Volatility Ratings, Exchange Act Release No. 42,476, 71 SEC Docket 1852 (Mar. 8, 2000) (“The
proposed rule change would permit, for an 18-month trial period, the use of the mutual fund
volatility ratings subject to certain limitations, and provided certain disclosures are made.”); Order
Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change to Initiate a Pilot Program that Allows
the Listing of Strike Prices at One-Point Intervals for Certain Stocks Trading under $20, Exchange
Act Release No. 48,013, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,933, 35,936 (June 11, 2003) (“The Commission expects
the Exchange to monitor the applicable equity options activity closely . . . . In addition, the
Commission requests that the PHLX monitor the trading volume associated with the additional
options series listed as a result of the Pilot Program . . . .”); Press Release, SEC Chairman Cox
Urges Options Exchanges to Start Limited Penny Quoting (June 7, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/ 2006-91.htm. For a discussion of pilot programs concerning
the practice of “preferencing,” see SEC, REPORT ON THE PRACTICE OF PREFERENCING,
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/prefrep.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
57. See Exchange Act § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78y (2000).
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commented upon by interested persons before the rule change becomes
“permanently effective.”
3. SEC Oversight
Section 19(g) of the Exchange Act requires every SRO to comply with
(and, in general to cause its members to comply with) its own rules, the
Exchange Act, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. The
SEC, under section 21 of the Exchange Act, may make investigations to
determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to
violate any provision of the Act or any SRO rule. The SEC also has
authority to institute cease and desist proceedings in the case of actual or
prospective violations of the Exchange Act.58 Within this context, the SEC
may investigate those individuals participating in anticompetitive practices
and take appropriate actions to eliminate such anticompetitive behavior. 59
Finally, section 19(d) of the Exchange Act permits appeals by affected
persons of certain SRO disciplinary sanctions, denials of access, and certain
other (but not all) SRO actions.
4. SEC Rulemaking
An important source of SEC rulemaking authority and policy direction
affecting market structure is section 11A of the Exchange Act, in which
Congress directed the SEC to “facilitate the establishment of a national
market system for securities.”60 In this regard, section 11A makes an
important policy choice regarding the role of government in market
structure development: it commands the SEC to take an activist role in
rulemaking to promote those attributes that Congress determined were
essential to the national market system which it envisioned.

58. Exchange Act § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (Supp. II 2002).
59. For example, in August 1996, as a result of a widely publicized economic study suggesting
that NASD market makers colluded to maintain artificially wide inside spreads on Nasdaq by
avoiding odd-eighth quotations in many stocks, the SEC issued a report in accordance with section
21(a) of the Exchange Act. See REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND NASDAQ MARKET, Exchange Act Release
No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996). Other enforcement proceedings against
securities markets have involved competition issues and have been directed, at least in part, at
remedying anticompetitive practices. See, e.g., In the Matter of Certain Activities of Options
Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 43,268, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1881 (Sept. 11, 2000)
(proceeding against The American Stock Exchange, The Chicago Board Options Exchange, The
Pacific Exchange, and The Philadelphia Stock Exchange for engaging in anticompetitive activities
and for failing to adequately enforce compliance with their own rules).
60. See Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (2000).
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Congress stated that the following interests should be assured in regard
to the national market system:
•
•

Economically efficient execution of securities transactions;
Fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange
markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than
exchange markets;
• The availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information
with respect to quotations for and transactions in securities; 61
• The practicability of brokers executing investors’ orders in the best
market; and
• An opportunity for investors’ orders to be executed without the
participation of a dealer.
In terms of its specific rulemaking authority in section 11A, the SEC is
authorized to compel joint action by competitors in regard to the national
market system.62 Also, it is important to note that section 23 of the
Exchange Act confers general rulemaking authority on the SEC.
When making rules pursuant to the Exchange Act, the SEC is required
to consider, among other matters, the impact that rule or regulation would
have on competition. The SEC is not permitted to adopt any rule or
regulation “which would impose a burden on competition not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of” the Exchange Act. When the
SEC adopts a rule, it must express in writing “the reasons for [its]
determination that any burden on competition imposed by such rule or
regulation is necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of” the
Exchange Act.63
61. See Exchange Act § 11A(1)(d) (“[An additional goal is] the linking of all markets for
qualified securities through communication and data processing facilities, [which] will foster
efficiency, enhance competition, increase the information available to brokers, dealers, and
investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors’ orders, and contribute to best execution of such
orders.”).
62. The SEC may “by rule or order, . . . authorize or require self-regulatory organizations to
act jointly with respect to matters as to which they share authority under this title in planning,
developing, operating, or regulating a national market system . . . .” Exchange Act § 11A(a)(3)(B).
In addition to issuing orders directing SRO collaboration under section 11A, the SEC also
approves “plans” submitted to the Commission by SROs to effectuate matters described in section
11A, such as inter-market linkages. See, e.g., Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,624–30
(June 29, 2005) (defining rules 601(a)(3) and 608); see generally Oesterle, supra note 11, at
12–25 (discussing the history, operation, and procedural aspects of these plans). For a recent
instance of such a plan proposal, see Notice of Filing of the NMS Linkage Plan by the American
Stock Exchange LLC, Boston Stock Exchange, Inc., Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.,
Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, National Stock Exchange, New
York Stock Exchange LLC, and NYSE Arca, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,239, 71 Fed.
Reg. 44,328 (Aug. 4, 2006).
63. It is interesting to note that the other federal securities statute that is of most direct
application to most securities markets and trading firms, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act), which concerns the registration of securities offerings, deals somewhat differently with
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Where the Commission is studying the effects of a rule, from time to
time it adopts the rule (or a partial exemption from a rule) on a temporary or
pilot basis. As with pilot approvals of SRO rules noted above, this permits
the SEC to study the effects of the rule on competition and on market
behavior. For example, there is currently a pilot program in effect which
exempts certain “short sales” of equity securities from the SEC’s and SRO
restrictions.64
Commission rulemaking under certain sections of the Exchange Act are
appealable to the federal circuit courts.65 Although such appeals to
Exchange Act rules are not common,66 there has recently been a spate of
successful challenges to SEC rulemakings under other statutory authority,67
including the Administrative Procedure Act.68
5. Exemptive Authority and No-Action Letters
a. Exemptive Authority
Section 36 of the Exchange Act allows the SEC to conditionally or
unconditionally exempt from the requirements of the Exchange Act “by
rule, regulation, or order . . . any person, security, or transaction, or any
class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions” so long as the
exemption “is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is
consistent with the protection of investors.” Section 36 further gives the
SEC authority to determine the procedures under which to grant exemptive
authority. The SEC may exercise discretion and decline any application for
an exemption. Various other provisions of the Exchange Act contain grants
of exemptive authority and/or the authority to define terms used in the

competition. Specifically, the provisions of the Securities Act that authorize the SEC to
promulgate rules and regulations do not require the SEC to consider the effects on competition.
See Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (Supp. II 2002).

64. On July 28, 2004, the Commission issued an order creating a one year pilot

suspending the provisions of Rule 10a-1(a) under the Act and any short sale price test
of any exchange or national securities association for short sales of certain securities.
The pilot was created pursuant to Rule 202T of Regulation SHO, which established
procedures to allow the Commission to temporarily suspend short sale price tests so
that the Commission could study the effectiveness of short sale price tests.

Order Extending Term of Short Sale Pilot, Exchange Act Release No. 53,684, 71 Fed. Reg.
24,765, 24,765 (Apr. 26, 2006) (citations omitted). The pilot approval has since been extended.
65. Exchange Act § 25(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(1) (2000).
66. See, e.g., Ass’n of Inv. Brokers v. SEC, 676 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
67. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); U.S. Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
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Exchange Act.69 Frequently, when the SEC promulgates rules under the
Exchange Act, it gives itself exemptive authority in respect of its own
rule.70
b. No-Action Letters
The SEC also issues informal guidance, which takes the form (among
others) of no-action letters. The SEC defines no-action letters as letters “in
which an authorized staff official indicates that the staff will not
recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the proposed
transaction described in the incoming correspondence is consummated.”71
Although most no-action letters are addressed to a single applicant and are
not intended to be relied upon by others, the staff sometimes issues
“generic” no-action letters that, by their terms, permit reliance by all
persons who meet the criteria specified in the letter.72 No-action letters are
not legally binding on the SEC and are not issued by the full authority of
the Commission, but instead represent the views of the staff of the Division
from which they are issued.73 The SEC takes the position that the staff’s
responses to letters “are not rulings . . . on questions of law or fact” and that
“such letters are not intended to affect the rights of private persons.”74
However, as a practical matter, despite the formal lack of precedential
significance of no-action letters, market participants widely rely upon noaction letters as if they did represent an official legal position.
In some respects, no-action letters are an ideal tool for the SEC to test
the waters by permitting new activities, which, while consistent with the

69. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (Supp. IV 2004) (defining terms);
Exchange Act § 5(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78e(2) (2000) (limited volume exchanges); Exchange Act
§ 6(h)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(4) (2000) (security futures); Exchange Act § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(c)
(2000) (certain exchange rules); Exchange Act § 15(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(2) (Supp. II 2002)
(registration of brokers and dealers); Exchange Act § 15B(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(4) (Supp. II
2002); Exchange Act § 17(h)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(h)(4) (Supp. IV 2004); Exchange Act § 17B(c),
15 U.S.C. § 78q-2(c) (2000) (penny stock automated quotation systems); Exchange Act § 31(f),
15 U.S.C. § 78ee(f) (Supp. II 2002) (transaction fees). By contrast, section 28 of the Securities Act
gives the SEC similar exemptive authority, but the SEC can only make exemptions by rule or
regulation. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2000). This means that the SEC has less flexibility to grant
exemptive relief from the registration requirements of the Securities Act than it is from the
requirements of the Exchange Act.
70. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.203(d), 242.301(a)(5), 240.3b-16 (2007).
71. Procedures Utilized by the Division of Corporation Finance for Rendering Informal
Advice, Securities Act Release No. 6253, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,644, 72,644 (Nov. 3, 1980).
72. See, e.g., Giovanni P. Prezioso, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1997 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 525 (Apr. 9, 1997) (concerning Exchange Act Rule 15a-6) [hereinafter Nine Firm Letter];
David C. Whitcomb, Jr., Chicago Stock Exchange, 2006 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 545 (July 20, 2006)
(concerning Exchange Act Rule 10a-1).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (2006).
74. Monthly Publication of List of Significant Letters Issued by the Division of Corporation
Finance, Securities Act Release No. 5691, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,682 (Mar. 17, 1976).
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relevant statutes,75 may be novel or represent a step beyond the current state
of agency rulemaking. Since the staff is not called upon to (and does not)
concur in the applicant’s legal analysis, the letter does not formally have
precedential effect and cannot be relied upon by third-parties, and the letter
can be withdrawn if (among other things) the staff’s view of the law or
policy changes. No-action letters are a low cost avenue to permit the limited
introduction of new business models which enhance competition.
C. LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND: ANTITRUST LAW AND
STATE LAW
1. Sherman Act and Doctrine of Implied Repeal
The principal federal statute governing competition in the securities
markets is the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).76 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”77 The
central concern of this section is concerted action.78 Section 2 of the
Sherman Act79 is mainly concerned with monopolization.80 The goals of the
Sherman Act are not as comprehensive as those of the SEC under the
Exchange Act, which along with being concerned with competitive issues,
is concerned with “the viability of sellers, the truthfulness of information,
with sharp practices that may injure customers, and with the smooth
functioning of trading institutions.”81 Often the regulatory scheme of the
Exchange Act conflicts with the policy of the Sherman Act.82 Although
Congress did not expressly exempt securities market conduct from the
Sherman Act, courts have historically utilized the doctrine of “implied
repeal” to reconcile potential or actual conflicts between the securities laws,
SEC actions, and SEC-approved SRO rules,83 and the Sherman Act, and to
decide whether an activity is immune from a Sherman Act challenge.84

75. While no-action letters purport to be a statement of enforcement intention, rather than a
statement of the law, the staff requires applicants to submit a legal opinion that the requested
action is consistent with applicable legal standards.
76. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004).
77. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1.
78. See IRVING SCHER, ANTITRUST ADVISER § 1.3 (4th ed. 2005).
79. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2.
80. See SCHER, supra note 78, § 1.3.
81. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 609
(2003).
82. See Russell L. Hewit, Securities Exchanges and the Antitrust Laws, 33 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 999, 999–1000 (1976).
83. Id. at 1000.
84. Id.
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Courts utilize the “implied repeal” doctrine in two situations. First,
courts will find implied repeal if Congress, via a specific statute, gave clear
authority to the SEC to supervise a particular activity and the application of
the antitrust laws would unduly interfere with the operation of the statute
and subject those who are regulated under the statute to conflicting
standards.85 Second, courts will find implied repeal if the regulatory scheme
established by Congress is so pervasive that applying the antitrust laws in
the face of such specific standards and broad regulatory authority would
subject the regulated entities to duplicative and inconsistent standards.86
Historically, the SEC’s active intervention in market structure has been
significant in preventing the application of inconsistent standards that might
have prevailed if ordinary antitrust rules applied.87
2. State Law and Preemption
SEC regulation in many instances also, explicitly or implicitly,
preempts state law. According to the Supremacy Clause of United States
Constitution, the laws of Congress are “the supreme law of the land.”88
When Congress chooses to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority,
state law must yield to it.89 Although Congress, when enacting the
Exchange Act, did not generally preempt state law,90 state law has been
explicitly overridden in certain instances by specific legislation. For
example, the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996
(NSMIA)91 preempts state laws respecting capital, custody, margin,
financial responsibility, recordkeeping, and other obligations of brokerdealers.92
In addition, courts imply congressional intent in instances where the
legislative scheme is “so pervasive that it raises a reasonable inference that
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
See United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
See Oesterle, supra note 11, at 18.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824). See generally Complaint, Sec. Indus. Ass’n
v. Klein, No. 2:06 CV 00623 (D. Utah July 28, 2006), available at http://www.sia.com/
utah_lawsuit/pdf/complaint.pdf (citing additional cases); Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies:
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State
Securities Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 101, 131 n.202 (1997) (citing additional cases).
90. See Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000) (“[T]he rights and remedies
provided in this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity.”).
91. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416.
92. See Exchange Act § 15(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(h) (2006). NSMIA also amended section 18 of
the Securities Act, preempting state registration and qualification requirements for certain
“covered securities.” See Brief for Plaintiff at 17, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial
Council of California, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C02 3486), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/nasddispute.htm.
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Congress left no room for a state to supplant it,” or where “compliance with
both federal and state laws is an impossibility.”93 Where the SEC takes
action within the scope of its delegated authority and pursuant to the
Exchange Act, inconsistent state law must give way.94 This is generally
thought to extend to SEC orders approving SRO rules.95
Other areas of law, including intellectual property law, can also impact
competition and even securities market structure.96
III. SOME STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT
STRUCTURE
A. STRENGTHS
The Exchange Act’s statutory scheme has many positive attributes.
Principally, it acknowledges that the success of the securities markets rests
upon various factors, and that the competition is but one leg of the stool.
93. See Shulick v. Painewebber, Inc., 722 A.2d 148, 150–51 (Pa. 1998) (finding that SEC
regulation of broker disclosure requirements impliedly preempted state agency law requirements).
94. Id. There are, of course, limits to the SEC’s jurisdictional authority to displace state law
through rulemaking. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the
SEC exceeded its authority under section 19(c) of the Exchange Act by promulgating certain rules
affecting voting rights).
95. See, e.g., Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005); see
also Carapico v. Philadelphia Stock Exch., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1994).
The full extent to which SRO rules preempt State law has been the subject of considerable debate,
but has not yet been resolved fully in litigation.
96. Intellectual property law affects competition in the securities markets in various ways.
Specifically, licensing arrangements with respect to “derivative” products that are based on
indices or other measures of value have enabled exchanges to have the exclusive right to trade
options based on the index—a large and increasing segment of securities products encompassing
exchange traded securities products, such as exchange traded funds and options on them and
equity index options. In many instances, intellectual property rights in respect of the use of
indexes have been used as a basis for claiming exclusive trading rights in overlying securities
products in situations where comparable non-derivative products would not have been permitted
to trade on an exclusive basis as a matter of securities law. See Exchange Act § 12(f), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l (Supp. IV 2004), with respect to unlisted trading privileges regarding exchange-listed
securities, and Exchange Act Rule 19c-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-5 (2006), concerning options
products. It has been asserted that exclusive intellectual property rights “directly affects
investors.” See Request for Rulemaking to Amend Rule 19c-5 Regarding Certain Options
Exchange Licensing Arrangements, SEC Petition 4-469 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-469.htm. Although claims of exclusivity and trading
rights in specific products have been slowly resolved on a case-by-case basis in the courts, see,
e.g., Dow Jones v. Int’l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006), there are still many open
questions, including exclusive rights to trade options based upon a security index. The extent to
which the SEC can and should intervene in these issues is a fertile and timely one. See generally
Annette L. Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks before the STA Annual Conference: Competition &
Regulation Balancing the National Market System (Oct. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100705aln.htm (discussing current market issues and
“broader regulatory challenges” that arise “as the financial landscape gets more sophisticated and
multi-dimensional”) [hereinafter Competition & Regulation Balancing the National Market
System].
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Congress’s delegation to the SEC of oversight authority with respect to the
SROs, as well as independent rulemaking authority, also recognizes an
essential point; the economic, legal and technological underpinnings of the
securities markets are constantly changing. Formulating policy in
promoting the welfare of the securities markets will necessarily involve an
assessment of the proper course in light of changing conditions. Thus, it
was wise to vest an expert body with the authority and practical ability to
balance these factors when formulating and implementing policy.
The doctrines of implied repeal and preemption also operate to the
benefit of the markets by giving effect to the sound policy that the ordinary
principles of competition law could operate at cross-purposes to the larger
scheme of regulation developed by the SEC in aid of the national market
system.
In effect, the system permits the SEC to leverage the benefits of
cooperative efforts by industry participants, such as broker-dealers acting
through national securities exchanges (or pursuant to their rules) and SROs
acting through National Market System plans, while keeping a watchful eye
on anti-competitive consequences.
In the last decade alone, the SEC has tackled many important market
structure issues without crushing competition, including:
•
•
•

Facilitating the almost total transition of member owned and
dominated exchanges to shareholder ownership and control;97
Approving the separation of The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.
from the NASD, and overseeing many developments in that
market;98
Implementing decimalization of all of the securities markets and the
inception of penny minimum price variations in the options
market;99

97. See, e.g., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order
Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 3, Exchange Act Release No. 49,098, 69 Fed.
Reg. 3974 (Jan. 27, 2004); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and
Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 1, Exchange Act Release No. 49,718,
69 Fed. Reg. 29,611 (May 24, 2004); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment
No. 1 and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 3 by the
Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51,149, 70 Fed. Reg. 7531 (Feb. 14,
2005); Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 3, and 5
Thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 6 and
8, Exchange Act Release No. 53,382, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 6, 2006); Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2, Exchange Act Release No. 53,963, 71 Fed.
Reg. 34,660 (June 15, 2006).
98. See In the Matter of the Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration as a
National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23,
2006); see also Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1, Exchange Act Release No. 54,084, 71 Fed. Reg.
38,935 (July 10, 2006).
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Introducing a very flexible and highly successful method for
exchange-like trading platforms to enter operation rapidly and
without most of the extensive requirements applicable to registered
national securities exchanges;100
Fostering multiple trading, creating a linkage system, discouraging
competitive practices, and approving new market entrants in listed
options markets;101
Establishing a new framework for intermarket order protection and
open intermarket access in the listed equities market;102
Casting a bright light on specialist practices at the NYSE through
enforcement action;103
Promulgating important order handling requirements104 and
extensive reporting of equity market execution quality in
furtherance of best execution and investor protection goals;105 and
Reconsidering the framework for short sale regulation.106

99. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: DECIMAL PRICING HAS
CONTRIBUTED TO LOWER TRADING COSTS AND A MORE CHALLENGING TRADING
ENVIRONMENT, REP. NO. GAO-05-535 (May 2005) [hereinafter GAO DECIMALIZATION
REPORT], for a full discussion of decimalization.
100. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998).
101. See generally Competitive Developments in the Options Markets, Exchange Act Release
No. 49,175, 69 Fed. Reg. 6124 (Feb. 9, 2004). See also Order Granting Approval to Proposed
Rule Change and Amendment No. 3 and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval to Amendment No. 4 Thereto by the Boston Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 49,068, 69 Fed. Reg. 2775 (Jan. 20, 2004); In the Matter of the Application of the
International Securities Exchange LLC for Registration as a National Securities Exchange,
Exchange Act Release No. 42,455, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,401 (Mar. 2, 2000).
102. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29,
2005).
103. See In the Matter of New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51,524,
2005 SEC LEXIS 814 (Apr. 12, 2005). See also In the Matter of Performance Specialist Group
LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 50,075, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1564 (July 26, 2004); In the Matter of
SIG Specialists, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,076, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1563 (July 26, 2004);
In the Matter of Bear Wagner Specialists LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49,498, 2004 SEC
LEXIS 743 (Mar. 30, 2004); In the Matter of Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
49,499, 2004 SEC LEXIS 744 (Mar. 30, 2004); In the Matter of LaBranche & Co. LLC, Exchange
Act Release No. 49,500, 2004 SEC LEXIS 749 (Mar. 30, 2004); In the Matter of Spear, Leeds &
Kellogg Specialists LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49,501, 2004 SEC LEXIS 742 (Mar. 30,
2004); In the Matter of Van der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange Act Release No.
49,502, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2197 (Mar. 30, 2004).
104. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg.
48,290 (Sept. 12, 1996) (adopting Exchange Act Rule 11Ac1-4 and amendments to 11Ac1-1).
105. See Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Exchange Act Release No.
43,590, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,414 (Dec. 1, 2000) (adopting Exchange Act Rules 11Ac1-5 and
11Ac1-6).
106. See supra note 3. See also Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50,103, 69 Fed. Reg.
48,008 (Aug. 6, 2004) (adopting Regulation SHO); Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange
Act Release No. 54,154, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,710 (July 21, 2006) (proposing amendments to
Regulation SHO); Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change to Exempt all
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Critics of the SEC’s most recent ambitious market structure initiative,
Regulation NMS, were particularly concerned about dampening
competition.107 Yet, it is clear that, while some business models may be
impacted, others are rising to take their place. It is worth noting that, since
the adoption of Regulation NMS, not only have traditional markets, like the
“regional” stock exchanges, submitted proposals to introduce new equity
trading platforms, in some cases backed by fresh capital,108 but also new
competitors have emerged.109 A newly reorganized Nasdaq promises to be a
potent force in competing for trading volume in NYSE stocks.110 Finally,
the NYSE has broadly enhanced its own trading platform with the
introduction of the Hybrid system.111
To be sure, Regulation NMS and other reforms will affect (sometimes
fatally) particular business models.112 And the SEC must be extremely
vigilant that certain business models, including those of market makers and
other liquidity providers, do not become unviable. Yet, at least in the case
of the equities market, if recent signs of intent to compete are an indication,
it seems unlikely that competition will perish, even if some business models
suffer or even fade.
The options market seems to be extremely vibrant and competition has
never been more intense, despite market structure reforms that many
predicted would have dire consequences.113 In addition, the velocity of
Securities in the NASDAQ-100 Index From the Price Test Set Forth in NASDAQ Rule 3350(a),
Exchange Act Release No. 54,435, 71 Fed. Reg. 55,042 (Sept. 20, 2006).
107. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,498–99
(June 29, 2005). Among other things, Regulation NMS requires trading centers to establish
policies and procedures to prevent “trade throughs” and eliminates sub-penny quoting in most
listed stocks.
108. See Lucchetti, supra note 4; Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Firms to Control NSX, WALL ST.
J. Sept. 5, 2006, at C3 (describing investments by major financial institutions in the National
Stock Exchange).
109. See Annette L. Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the Mutual Fund Directors Forum:
Lifting The Veil—Investment Industry Trading Practices And Best Execution Workshop (June 7,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch060706aln.htm. See, e.g., Order
Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 2 Thereto to Establish Rules for a ScreenBased Trading System for Non-Option Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 54,422, 71 Fed.
Reg. 54,537 (Sept. 15, 2006); Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 1 Thereto
Relating to Establishing ISE Stock Exchange, LLC as a Facility of the International Securities
Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,399, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,728 (Sept. 12, 2006).
110. See NASDAQ Market Share Statistics, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader/
tradingservices/marketshare.stm (noting that for the month of August 2006, Nasdaq’s total market
share in NYSE securities was roughly twenty-eight percent). See also Nasdaq Beats NYSE in
August Market Share Grab, WALL ST. LETTER, Sept. 18, 2006, at 4.
111. See News Release, New York Stock Exch., NYSE Completes Hybrid Market Phase III
Activation (Jan. 24, 2007), available at http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/hybmarket/
1127349068564.html (follow “NYSE Completes Hybrid Market Phase III Activation” link).
112. See GAO DECIMALIZATION REPORT, supra note 99, at 8, 44.
113. See, e.g., id. at 64–67. See generally Order Approving Options Intermarket Linkage Plan
Submitted by the American Stock Exchange LLC, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., and
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introduction of significant new systems and modalities of listed options
trading is staggering.114
Although the SEC has been less active in directly regulating the
corporate bond market, those market structure innovations that the SEC has
encouraged, particularly the NASD’s TRACE system for transaction reporting,115 have been successful in promoting transparency in that market
without compromising competition.116
Thus, although past results cannot guarantee future performance, it is
hard to say that the major market structure initiatives have fatally
compromised competition overall or hurt the markets.
B. WEAKNESSES
Despite the strengths of the current market structure, the system also
has a number of significant flaws. For example, the process for establishing
standards lacks transparency and is slow, the SEC’s staff is too cautious,
and the Commission and its staff lack clear standards for considering the
international implications of its actions.
1. The Process for Establishing Standards is Often Opaque
It is something of a paradox that the SEC exerts much of its market
structure influence without any transparency. Although rulemaking and
SRO rule approvals require a notice and public comment process,117 in
practice, much policy setting is not subjected to that discipline. There are
several reasons for this lack of transparency.
International Securities Exchange LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 43,086, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,023
(Aug. 4, 2000), for a discussion of comments in opposition to options inter-market linkage.
114. See, e.g., Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendments No. 1, 2, and 3 Thereto To
Adopt a Simple Auction Liaison System to Auction Qualifying Marketable Orders for Potential
Price Improvement, Exchange Act Release No. 54,229, 71 Fed. Reg. 44,058 (Aug. 3, 2006)
(approving, on a pilot basis, CBOE’s AIM system); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and
Amendments No. 1 and 2 and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of
Amendment No. 3 Thereto Relating to the Establishment of the OX Trading Platform, Exchange
Act Release No. 54,238, 71 Fed. Reg. 44,758 (Aug. 7, 2006) (approving NYSE Arca’s OX
Trading Platform). Nasdaq has also indicated recently its intention to enter the options market. See
Jenny Anderson, Nasdaq is Planning to Start Options Exchange in 2007, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2006, at C3.
115. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 4 to the Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 43,873, 66 Fed. Reg. 8131
(Jan. 29, 2001).
116. See, e.g., Annette L. Nazareth, Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation, SEC, Testimony before the
United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, (June 17, 2004)
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts061704aln.htm; Cynthia A. Glassman,
Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at The Bond Market Association Legal & Compliance Conference in
New York City, N.Y. (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=440.
117. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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a. Rulemaking
Rulemaking is a resource intensive process, which requires the
Commission to present elaborate analysis regarding the proposal and its
impacts both under the Exchange Act118 and under other legal regimes.119
Thus, it is natural for the staff to seek other, less burdensome means to
effect policy and carry out the agency’s mission.120
Moreover, the Commission has been subjected to various successful
challenges to its rulemaking,121 which, no doubt, will tend to discourage and
further deter the use of this avenue.122
Another factor that contributes to the opacity in the establishment of
new behavioral norms is the SEC’s organizational structure. The SEC is
organized in a way that promotes standard setting other than through the
rulemaking process. Since the Office of Compliance and Inspections and
Examination (OCIE) and the Division of Enforcement (Enforcement) are
effectively co-equals with the Division of Market Regulation, their agendas
and legal interpretations are not necessarily aligned with those of the
Division of Market Regulation. Increasingly, these units are establishing
new modalities of behavior through the inspection process or through
enforcement settlements that involve behavioral undertakings with industrywide and market structure impacts.123 OCIE and Enforcement often are
tempted to (and do) fill regulatory gaps that should be addressed in formal
SEC rules by establishing new standards of conduct through the
examination and inspection process and not via rulemaking.124 Naturally,
118. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
119. In addition to the requirements of the Exchange Act noted above, SEC rulemaking requires

compliance with a variety of other technical requirements, such as the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C., and as a note to 5 U.S.C. § 601), Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 603 (1996), and the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C §§ 3501–3520
(1995).
120. See Richard H. Walker, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at The Bond Market
Association’s 6th Annual Legal and Compliance Seminar: Regulation vs. Enforcement in an OnLine World (Oct. 25, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch413.htm.
121. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
122. See Lawsuits, Regulatory Scrutiny Threaten SEC, Its Mission, Campos Says,
8 Broker/Dealer Compliance Rep. (BNA) No. 34 (Aug. 23, 2006) (regarding the implications of
this litigation on the mission of the SEC).
123. See Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks before the IA Compliance Best Practices
Summit 2006 (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022806psa.htm
(“An integrated structure could allow for improved interaction and exchange between the folks
who write and interpret rules and those who are on the frontlines interacting with registrants and
assessing their compliance with our rules.”).
124. See, e.g., Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement, SEC Litigation
Release No. 18,438, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2601 (Oct. 31, 2003); In the Matter of Certain Activities of
Options Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 43,268, 73 SEC Docket 530 (Sept. 11, 2000); In
the Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,538,
62 SEC Docket 1346 (Aug. 8, 1996); In the Matter of Certain Market Making Activities on
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standards of conduct that are imposed in undertakings by regulated entities
that are parties to enforcement settlements with “remedial” undertakings do
not have the benefit of notice and public comment, nor are they subjected to
the careful balancing of the factors, including competition, that the SEC is
obliged to weigh in rulemaking and other official actions.125 Moreover,
settlements may not reflect actual legal standards, but rather the give and
take of negotiation between the Enforcement staff and respondents/litigants.
In these latter cases, the policy outcome is not structurally guaranteed to be
informed by the formal and mandatory consideration and balancing of
competitive effects and other factors that the SEC must engage in when
promulgating rules. Therefore, the carefully crafted standards for weighing
competition in the Exchange Act are effectively subverted.126
Perhaps because of the inherent difficulties in rulemaking and the other
factors noted above, the SEC’s stance on many significant matters affecting
market structure are not clearly stated in final rules, but are the subject of
unofficial general statements that the market place must use to read the tea
leaves. For example, although the SEC has continuously stated its view that
promoting best execution is a key aspect of its policymaking, and indeed,
has taken many official actions to support and undergird best execution in
the marketplace,127 it has refused to give definition to this concept or to
Nasdaq, Exchange Act Release No. 40,900, 68 SEC Docket 2693 (Jan 11, 1999); SEC v. Credit
Suisse First Boston Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 17,327 (Jan. 22, 2002); In the Matter of
New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 41,574, 70 SEC Docket 106 (June
29, 1999). See also In the Matter of Canadian Imperial Holdings Inc. & CIBC World Markets
Corp., Securities Act Release No. 8592, Exchange Act Release No. 52,063, Investment Advisors
Act Release No. 2407, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1773 (July 20, 2005). A recent enforcement settlement
in which the SEC concluded, without detailed analysis, that certain swaps were unlawful under the
margin rules, a proposition that has caused much consternation, and possibly divergent practices
in the world of equity swaps.
125. These concerns are not, of course, limited to the SEC, but arise in many areas of
Administrative Law. See, e.g., 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-5 (2006) (labor law); Phillip J. Kolczynsk, A
Dangerous New Precedent in FAA Enforcement Law (Oct. 25, 2000), http://www.aviation
lawcorp.com/content/dangerous.html (FAA law); Comments of Verizon Wireless, In the Matter of
Petition for Rulemaking to Enhance Security and Authentication Standards For Access to
Customer Proprietary Network Information, CC Docket No. 96-115, RM 11277 (Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/iei/sbc_comments.pdf.
126. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1990), for a full discussion of various pitfalls
relating to regulation by enforcement. See also Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks before the
National Association for Variable Annuities (June 28, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/spch062805psa.htm.
127. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,508
(June 29, 2005) (“[O]ne of the primary benefits of the Order Protection Rule is to backstop a
broker’s duty of best execution. . . .”); Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,590, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,414, 75,420 (Dec. 1, 2000); Commission
Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 54,165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978, 41,978 (July 24, 2006)
(“Fiduciary principles require money managers to seek the best execution for client trades . . . .”).
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articulate a standard regarding the implications of such related practices as
payment for order flow and similar order flow routing arrangements,
internalization, and (in the case of the options markets) seeking to have
orders executed in “mini auctions” in evaluating compliance with best
execution obligations.128 Therefore, collectively, this inaction leaves market
participants to decide for themselves and to be subject to inspections and
examinations where unknown standards will apply to their performance.
Options markets in particular have been offering arrangements similar to
payment for order flow and/or that encourage order flow arrangements
(sometimes called “directed orders”) between firms and price improvement
auction facilities. Market participants may be at a loss concerning the
significance of these practices for evaluating their order flow costing
arrangements. Therefore, the SEC’s official silence on how these practices
effect best execution analysis in options has itself become a significant
market structure issue.
b. SRO Rule Proposals
Much of the SRO rule review process goes on behind the scenes, with
the Commission staff commenting on successive drafts of filings that are
not published for public comment until that unofficial review process is
complete. The SROs have no effective means of causing the publication of
their filings in order to trigger the notice and comment process. That is, the
SEC must, within 35 days following the publication of a notice of filing of a
proposed rule change, either approve a proposed rule change or institute
proceedings to disapprove it (subject to the ability to extend this period of
up to 90 days in certain circumstances).129 However, there is no statutory
provision contained in the SEC’s rules that compels the staff to publish
such a notice within a set time period.130
See also Market 2000, supra note 18, for a historical overview of the SEC’s involvement in
promoting best execution and reluctance to establish definitive global standards.
128. See, e.g., SEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS & OFFICE OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SPECIAL STUDY: PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW AND INTERNALIZATION IN
THE OPTIONS MARKETS, (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ordpay.htm;
Competitive Developments in the Options Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 49,175, 69 Fed.
Reg. 6124 (Feb. 9, 2004); Elizabeth K. King, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation, SEC, Remarks
before the 2006 Options Industry Conference (May 5, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2006/spch050506ekk.htm; Elizabeth K. King, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation,
SEC, Remarks before the 2003 Options Industry Conference (May 13, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch051305ek.htm; OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND
EXAMINATIONS, SEC, REPORT CONCERNING EXAMINATIONS OF ORDER ROUTING AND
EXECUTION, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/optionsroutingreport.pdf (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007).
129. Exchange Act § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (2000).
130. The SEC has stated at various times in the past that it is mindful of the burdens of delays in
publishing SRO rule proposals for public comment and expressed an intent to expedite the
process. See Proposed Rule Changes of Self Regulatory Organizations; Annual Filing of
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Thus, the staff has considerable power to cause an SRO to bow to the
staff’s “desk drawer” views of policy, since rule proposals can be held up
indefinitely, sometimes for years, in this unpublished state. The Division of
Market Regulation often imposes informal standards of conduct not
contained in the Exchange Act or its own rules as a condition for publishing
and later approving SRO initiatives.131 As a consequence, despite the fact
that SRO rule filings are subject to a notice and public comment process,
this will not necessarily reveal the staff’s thinking in imposing an unwritten
standard upon the SRO. Moreover, even though the SEC’s approval orders
are subject to judicial review, an informal condition imposed on the SRO by
the SEC in this manner would not necessarily be reviewable, since potential
litigants would not necessarily be able to claim that they were aggrieved by
that aspect of the Commission approval order.
A further defect in the SRO rule proposal process is that often the SEC
does not expressly enunciate the basis on which it determined the impact, if
any, on competition of the rule proposal, and whether such impact is
justified. Rather, its statements are generally conclusory and its analysis is
not described. The staff rarely institutes proceedings to disapprove rule
filings, even where a proposal does not meet the staff’s standards from a
competition perspective. Rather, the staff either declines to notice the
proposal for public comment or asks an SRO to voluntarily withdraw the
proposal. This process makes it difficult for markets and market participants
to form a view regarding the staff’s analytical approach to competitive
impact, which, in turn, makes planning extremely difficult. Moreover, the
SEC is effectively not held accountable with regard to the consistency of its
analysis and approach to competition as it relates to SRO rule filings.
Amendments to Registration Statements of National Securities Exchanges, Securities
Associations, and Reports of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Exchange Act Release
No. 35,123, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,692, 66,699 (proposed Dec. 20, 1994).
131. For example, in various national securities exchange demutualizations, the staff has
indicated its policy to require certain limitations on ownership and voting by exchange
shareholders. See, e.g., Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
NYSE’s Business Combination With Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
53,382, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,256–57 (Mar. 6, 2006); Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market
LLC for Registration as a National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 53,128,
71 Fed. Reg. 3550, 3552 (Jan. 23, 2006). Although the SEC has proposed rulemaking that would
codify these requirements, see Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 50,699, 84 SEC Docket 444 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004),
they are not embedded in the Exchange Act or regulations. In effect, demutualizing SROs were
forced to accept this unwritten policy as a condition to publication of their proposed postdemutualization rules. Similarly, in the options market, the staff has imposed an informal standard
regarding the maximum that a specialist or equivalent market maker at parity, or a firm that
facilitates an order, may receive on a guaranteed basis when executing an order. See, e.g., Chicago
Board Options Exchange Rules 6.45A & 6.74A; Philadelphia Stock Exchange Rules 1014(g)
&1064 [hereinafter PHLX Rules]; International Securities Exchange Rule 713 (regarding
enhanced split rules in options trading); NYSE Arca Rule 6.47 (regarding facilitation rules).
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c. Summary
In the aggregate, an opaque process is bad because market participants
are not uniformly aware of the SEC’s true views of the state of the law and
the rationale for those views. Market participants often operate in a zone of
uncertainty regarding the legality of particular practices. Moreover, they
cannot make rational business plans for introducing new products, systems,
and methods, without clarity regarding the time frames in which their
proposals (or the SEC’s own) will be acted upon. All of this affects
competition and market structure.
2. The Process is Slow
The Commission staff is very deliberative and careful, and the notice
and public comment process extremely important in drawing out well
informed views of investors and market professions likely to be affected.
Moreover, it is inevitable that proposals (particularly those of SROs) may
not be what they seem, and careful review is merited because of the
technical complexity of many such proposals and the potential for
burdening competition. However, in general, slow is bad. SEC rulemaking
proposals and its consideration of SRO filings can take years to be
finalized, often dying of their own weight.132 First, market participants often
do not know with certainty the legality of particular practices.133 Second,
they cannot make effective plans for introducing new products, systems and
methods, without clarity regarding the time frames in which their proposals
(or the SEC’s own) will be acted upon.134 This burdens competition because
players with the greatest appetite for regulatory risk develop a competitive
“first mover advantage,” disadvantaging the most responsible market
participants. Also, bureaucratic delay tends to entrench existing participants
because it can be a barrier to entry for would-be entrants with new and
innovative business models.

132. The SEC reported that it received 959 SRO rule filings during its 2005 fiscal year, and that
80% (765) had been reviews by the staff and approved or disapproved within 60 days of receipt of
the last amendment filed by the SRO. SEC, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
41 Ex.2.8 (Nov. 25, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2005.pdf.
However, this performance statistic must be taken with a grain of salt, since many SRO rule
filings are submitted initially in draft form and therefore not “filed” until the staff has advised the
SRO that the draft filing is generally satisfactory to the staff. Moreover, the staff often requests
multiple non-substantive amendments during the course of their processing a filing. Also, in many
instances, filings are withdrawn (sometimes at the staff’s request) and subsequently re-filed.
133. See Annette L. Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks before the ICI Equity Markets
Conference (Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092205aln.htm
(“[M]arket participants need certainty and the rules of the road must be clear for them to function
efficiently and compete effectively in a globally competitive marketplace.”).
134. Id. See also Competition & Regulation Balancing the National Market System, supra note
96, at 2; SEC OPERATIONS, supra note 18, at 15–16.
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3. The Staff is Cautious
Despite numerous sources of authority to grant exemptive relief, define
terms, and issue no-action and similar guidance,135 the staff is reluctant to
grant such relief.136 The process is generally very protracted.137 Moreover,
rulemaking cannot capture all permutations and scenarios. Where the SEC
staff is requested to permit activity that does not raise the concerns
addressed by the general rule, or to give clarity and definition to the
application of rules, the staff should use its authority more liberally,
particularly if the grants promote fair competition that do not threaten to
compromise investor protection. Moreover, outside of the context of SRO
rule approvals, the Commission’s use of pilot programs and temporary rules
to permit it to study the impact of specific actions is too infrequent. These
would seem to be an ideal way for the Commission to validate whether its
assumptions regarding competitive impact are appropriate.
In regard to SRO rule filings, the staff often does not permit filings that
technically qualify for effective upon filing or similar treatment in
accordance with the Exchange Act138 and SEC rules. Instead, the staff often

135. See supra Part II.B.5.
136. Between January 1, 2006 and August 31, 2006, the Division of Market Regulation issued
only forty-four no-action letters that were thought to be of sufficient significance to publish on the
SEC website. See Division of Market Regulation: Exemptive Orders and Exemptive, Interpretive,
and No-Action Letters, Chronological List of No-Action Letters, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
marketreg/mr-noaction.shtml#chron (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). The SEC website also lists one
interpretive statement, see SEC Interpretive Releases, http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp.shtml (last
visited Mar. 1, 2007), and five section 36 orders, see Exemptive Orders, http://www.sec.gov/
rules/exorders.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2007), involving market regulation issues. Outside of the
context of SRO rule approvals, no new pilot programs affecting market regulation issues were
introduced during this period.
137. See SEC OPERATIONS, supra note 18, at 14; cf. SEC 2005 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 132, at 41 Ex.2.7. The SEC reported that 85% of
exemptive, no-action and interpretive requests (across all Divisions) in 2005 were issued within
six months. Id. This performance statistic must be taken in context. Most requests for this type of
relief are submitted and negotiated in draft form, and no formal request is made until the staff is
satisfied. If the staff does not indicate that it is prepared to issue the relief requested, the request is
often (but not always) withdrawn. Therefore, requests for relief that are ultimately granted are
generally formally submitted (following negotiation with the staff) very close in time to when the
staff is ready to issue the letter granting the relief. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Oakes, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 300 (Mar. 2, 2007); William G. Farrar, SEC No-Action Letter,
2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 227 (Feb. 8, 2007).
138. The Exchange Act provides that a proposed rule change may take effect upon filing with
the Commission if they fall within the following categories:
(i)

constituting a stated policy, practice, or interpretation with respect to the meaning,
administration, or enforcement of an existing rule of the self-regulatory
organization,

(ii) establishing or changing a due, fee, or other charge imposed by the self-regulatory
organization, or
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prefers to handle SRO filings in the “ordinary way”: subject to notice and
public comment prior to effectiveness. The Commission rarely, if ever,
relies upon its statutory authority to put a rule filing into effect
summarily.139 Given the Commission’s ability to abrogate filings that have
taken effect upon filing within 60 days and requiring them to be refiled in
the ordinary way, this approach seems unnecessarily cautious. It also
possibly burdens competition in two respects. First, it denies the SRO the
ability to “test the waters” by quickly implementing a system or rule
without subjecting it to extensive pre-approval public comment and waiting
period.140 Second, the handling of these proposals consumes valuable staff

(iii) concerned solely with the administration of the self-regulatory organization or
other matters which the Commission, by rule, consistent with the public interest
and the purposes of this subsection, may specify . . . [as being eligible for effective
on filing treatment].
Exchange Act § 19(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A) (2000).
Section 19(b)(3)(A) is implemented by Exchange Act Rule 19b-4(f), which incorporates
verbatim the categories in clauses (i) and (ii) of § 19(b)(3)(A), reprinted above, as well as the
category of rules that are concerned only with administration. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2004). It
also includes, among other things, that a proposed rule change may take effect upon filing with the
Commission pursuant to § 19(b)(3) of the Act, if properly designated by the self-regulatory
organization as:
[(1)] Effecting a change in an existing order-entry or trading system of a self-regulatory
organization that:
(i)

Does not significantly affect the protection of investors or the public interest;

(ii) Does not impose any significant burden on competition, or have the effect of
limiting the access to or availability of the system; or
[(2)] Effecting a change that:
(i)

Does not significantly affect the protection of investors or the public interest;

(ii) Does not impose any significant burden on competition, and
(iii) By its terms, does not become operative for 30 days after the date of the
filing, or such shorter time as the Commission may designate if consistent
with the protection of investors and the public interest.
Exchange Act § 19(b)(3). In this latter case, the SRO must give the SEC written notice of its intent
to file the proposed rule change, along with a brief description and text of the proposed rule
change, at least five business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed rule change. Id.
In 2001, The Commission proposed Rule 19b-6, which would have expanded the
categories of proposed rule changes eligible for effective upon filing treatment. See Rule Changes
by Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 43,860, 66 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8912
(proposed Feb. 5, 2001). However, it never acted upon this proposal.
139. The authority is derived from Exchange Act § 19(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(B)
(2000) (“[A] proposed rule change may be put into effect summarily if it appears to the
Commission that such action is necessary for the protection of investors, the maintenance of fair
and orderly markets, or the safeguarding of securities or funds.”).
140. By contrast, “designated contract markets” (i.e., futures exchanges) regulated by the CFTC
have the option of filing rules with the CFTC and “self-certif[ying]” that the rule complies with

2007]

Procedural Reform in Market Regulation

439

resources that might be better utilized in processing proposals that have
potentially larger policy ramifications.
4. There are No Standards for the SEC’s Consideration of
International Implications of its Actions Under the
Exchange Act
The Commission and the staff are well aware of the implications of
their actions on international competition.141 The most well-publicized
current ramification of this is the application of U.S. accounting and
auditing standards and the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to
foreign issuers.142 There are, however, other less visible, but highly
significant, cross-border issues such as the ability of U.S. residents to trade
and purchase securities products traded on foreign securities markets, and
the extent to which foreign financial institutions may access U.S. investors.
The SEC does not ignore the significance of these issues, and takes
cautious, but non-systematic, steps to address them.143 By contrast, the
the Commodity Exchange Act or seeking affirmative CFTC approval of such rules. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 38.4(b), 40.6 (2002).
141. See, e.g., Market 2000, supra note 18, Study VII; Laura S. Unger, Comm’r, SEC, Speech
at the Third National Securities Trading on the Internet Conference: The Global Marketplace,
Ready or Not Here it Comes (Jan. 24, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch344.htm. See also SEC OPERATIONS, supra note 18, at 10. For a discussion of the
integral part that financial services plays in the global economy, see U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO
RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE, REP. NO. GAO 05-61, at 44–46 (Oct. 2004).
142. See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the University of Cologne, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Goals, Content, and Status of Implementation (Feb. 5, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020503psa.htm; Aaron Lucchetti & Carrick
Mollenkamp, New York to Study Lack of IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at C3. See also
Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section
12(g) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Exchange Act Release No. 55,005, 72 Fed. Reg. 1384 (proposed Dec. 22, 2006).
143. See, e.g., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 138 (Jan. 30, 1996) (concerning Exchange Act Rule 15a-6); Nine Firm Letter, supra note
72 (concerning Exchange Act Rule 15a-6); Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 662 (July 27, 2005) (concerning the sales of certain foreign
options listed on Eurex) [hereinafter Foreign Options on Eurex No-Action]; Order Granting
Limited Volume Exemption from Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities
Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 41,199, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,953 (Mar. 22, 1999); Morgan
Stanley & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 975 (Dec. 20, 1996) (granting
no-action relief with respect to broker-dealer registration requirements due to Indian law
restrictions applicable to transactions executed through local broker-dealers); Futures Industry
Association, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 693 (Aug. 20, 2002); Macquarie
Media Holdings Limited and Macquarie Media Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 799 (Sept. 27, 2005); Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, Exchange Act
Release No. 49,831, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (June 21, 2004); Application of the Definition of
Narrow-based Security Index to Debt Securities Indexes and Security Futures on Debt Securities,
Exchange Act Release No. 54,106, 71 Fed. Reg. 39,534 (July 13, 2006). See also Custody of
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CFTC has a very liberal regime for permitting access by U.S. persons to
foreign futures exchanges and foreign futures products without subjecting
the markets, brokers and products to extensive U.S. regulation.144
One instance of the SEC’s caution in balancing international
competition and investor access concerns is in the area of exchange-traded
derivative products. Although U.S. investors may freely invest in foreign
shares and other securities,145 and do in large quantities,146 their access to
risk management tools, such as options on indexes, single securities,
exchange-traded funds (ETFs), security futures, and index futures based
upon foreign stocks and foreign stock indexes, are often quite limited.
These limitations are generally in the name of investor protection. The
offering of these products in the United States is, in some cases, bounded by
statute or other rules.147 Yet, in many cases, where the SEC has discretion, it
chooses to limit sales of these products very conservatively. For example, a
foreign options exchange may not effectively permit access to its options
products without submitting to a laborious no-action process, which to date
has narrowly limited sales of such products to “qualified institutional
buyers,” as defined under Rule 144A under the Securities Act.148 Also, U.S.
options exchanges are effectively limited in their ability to list and trade
index options with significant foreign stock components or options on ETFs

Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2176, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,692 (Oct. 1, 2003) (concerning foreign custodians); Investment Company
Act Rules 17f-5 and 17f-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17f-5, 270.17f-7 (2000) (permitting certain
international banks to act as custodians for certain assets owned by U.S. registered investment
companies).
144. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Foreign Futures and Options, http://www.cftc.gov/
dea/deadcioforeignfuturesandoptions.htm?from=home&page=epforeignopscontent.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2007).
145. See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, INTERNATIONAL INVESTING: GET THE FACTS 2 (1999),
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/ininvest.pdf. Even so, the offering of such securities into the United States
is clearly subject to limitations under the Securities Act and, in many instances, state securities
laws. Moreover, large numbers of U.S. shareholders can subject foreign issuers to registration
under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. See Exchange Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (Supp. IV
2004). But the issuer may perfect an exemption under Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g3-2(b) (2005).
146. See, e.g., SEC OPERATIONS, supra note 18, at 10.
147. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 6(h)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(h)(4)(A) (2000); Examining the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 and Recent Market Developments: Hearing before
the S. Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 11–12 (2005) (testimony of
Robert L.D. Colby, Deputy Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/ts090805rldc.htm [hereinafter Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
Hearing, Colby Testimony]; Kevin M. Foley, Foreign Products: Still Off-limits to U.S. Investors,
FUTURES INDUSTRY MAG. (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/fimagazi1929.asp?a=743 (noting that the equity option listing standard requires class of underlying stock
to be registered under the Exchange Act). See also PHLX Rule 1009(a)(1).
148. See, e.g., Foreign Options on Eurex No-Action, supra note 143.
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and similar instruments.149 Narrow-based index futures on foreign equities
that are not registered under the Exchange Act are also restricted.150 As a
result, much hedging of foreign securities investments must be done in the
over-the-counter markets, which lack transparency, have relatively high
transaction costs and are limited to non-retail investors.151
The SEC has taken steps to address access and competition issues
involving these types of products, such as promulgating joint rulemaking
with the CFTC to permit narrow-based index options on foreign sovereign
bonds152 and announcing other initiatives.153 However, there is no overarching policy guidance directing the SEC’s actions in this arena.
The SEC is also taking pains to balance investor protection concerns
with respect to the ability of foreign broker-dealers, including those
affiliated with U.S. financial institutions, to do business in the United
States. The current framework, which has been in place since 1989, is
awkward and in need of reconsideration.154 Likewise, although there have
been calls for greater access of U.S. investors and intermediaries to
“screens” of foreign securities markets, direct access to foreign markets by
U.S. investors has not been comprehensively revisited for almost a
decade.155
The fault here, if there is one, does not rest principally with the agency.
The SEC’s formal actions, and institutional direction, must be guided by the
149. See, e.g., PHLX Rule 1009A(b)(9), (d)(10); PHLX Rule 1009 cmts. .03, .06(b), .07(b);
Amendment to Rule Filing Requirements for Self-Regulatory Organizations Regarding New
Derivative Securities Products, Exchange Act Release No. 40,761, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,952 (Dec. 22,
1998) (limiting percentage of underlying securities that may be of issuers in jurisdictions with
which there is no surveillance agreement, and requiring absence of blocking statute and real time
reporting).
150. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 Hearing, Colby Testimony, supra note
147, at 11–12; Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 Hearing, SIA Testimony, supra
note 34, at 6.
151. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12) (2000) (defining “eligible contract
participant”).
152. Application of the Definition of Narrow-Based Security Index to Debt Securities Indexes
and Security Futures on Debt Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 54,106, 71 Fed. Reg. 39,534
(July 13, 2006) (adopting CFTC Rule 41.15 and adding Exchange Act Rule 3a55-4).
153. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 Hearing, Colby Testimony, supra note
147, at 11–12.
154. Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,017,
54 Fed. Reg. 30,013 (July 18, 1989) (adopting Exchange Act Rule 15a-6). Based upon a recent
speech by SEC Director of Market Regulation, Eric R. Sirri, it seems possible that the SEC staff
may currently support incremental liberalization of the limited safe harbor for foreign brokerdealers contained in Exchange Act Rule 15a-6. Eric R. Sirri, Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation, SEC,
Speech in Boston, Massachusetts: Trading in Foreign Shares (Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030107ers.htm [hereinafter Trading in Foreign
Shares].
155. See Concept Release: Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62
Fed. Reg. 30,485 (June 4, 1997). This issue does not seem likely to be resolved in the foreseeable
future. See Trading in Foreign Shares, supra note 154, at 24, 27–28.
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law. The SEC lacks a clear Congressional or other policy direction with
respect to the roles of international cooperation, competitiveness of U.S.
and non-U.S. financial institutions, and U.S. investor access in the calculus
that it must make when making rules, issuing orders and taking other
actions under the Exchange Act. Therefore, there may be no specific legal
basis for according these factors much weight, and it is difficult for the staff
to counterbalance these factors against other concerns that they are charged
with, such as investor protection.
As our principal exchanges combine and affiliate with foreign
markets,156 there is likely to be accelerating pressure on the SEC to develop
a more effective framework for U.S. investor access to foreign securities
products and services, including access to foreign securities exchanges.
Perhaps it is time for a larger reconsideration of whether the Commission
should have more specific policy direction in regard to the role of
international competition and investor access to foreign products and
markets.157
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
A. ESTABLISH NEW STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MARKET
PARTICIPANTS THROUGH THE RULEMAKING PROCESS AND NOT
IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL STAFF POLICY
DETERMINATIONS, EXAMINATIONS AND INSPECTIONS AND
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
As outlined above, the Exchange Act carefully crafts administrative
procedures for rulemaking, issuing orders, and approving SRO rule filings.
These procedures (a) direct that certain factors, including competitive
effects, be considered, (b) provide for notice and public comment, and (c)
provide for an appeal process. All of this is subverted when the SEC
effectively establishes new rules through industry enforcement settlements,
offhand comments in settlements, remedial “recommendations” in OCIE
inspection or examination reports, or unofficial statements in Commissioner
or senior staff speeches. None of these processes require the same degree of
balanced consideration and transparency as rulemaking does. These
156. See, e.g., Press Release, New York Stock Exch., NYSE Euronext to Commence Offer for
Euronext Shares (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1149157439121.html;
Press Release, New York Stock Exch., NYSE Group to Purchase 5% Equity Interest in National
Stock Exchange, India’s Largest Financial Marketplace (Jan. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.nyse.com/press/1168342114215.html; Press Release, N. Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Group
and Tokyo Stock Exchange Enter Strategic Alliance (Jan. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.nyse.com/press/1170156819950.html; Press Release, Nasdaq, Acquisition of Shares in
LSE Group PLC (Feb. 10, 2007), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2007/
ne_section07_014.stm.
157. See Trading in Foreign Shares, supra note 154.
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informal standard setting processes also deny affected parties the possibility
to voice their positions or present relevant data. Therefore, establishing
industry standards by means other than rulemaking certainly burdens
competition, and does not take into account the full scope of policy
considerations which Congress intended.
Thus, despite the difficulties inherent in the process of rulemaking, the
SEC should not give in to the temptation to “take the easy road” in
establishing industry-wide standards of conduct through these other means.
In addition, the Commission should seek to ensure that the legal positions
of the Divisions of Market Regulation and Enforcement and OCIE are
closely aligned, and that their inspection and examination process and
rulemaking priorities are in synch.
B. REFORM THE PROCEDURES FOR APPROVALS OF SRO RULE
PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO MAKE MORE TYPES OF PROPOSALS
ELIGIBLE FOR “EFFECTIVE ON FILING” OR OTHER EXPEDITED
PROCESSING
The staff of the Division of Market Regulation diligently and
intelligently scrutinize SRO rule filings with a cautious eye for anticompetitive and discriminatory concerns. However, in many cases the
benefits of such scrutiny do not outweigh the burdens on competition
implied by delay. In some instances, the concerns raised in staff reviews are
hypothetical or nonsubstantive. SROs, when functioning in their capacity as
market operators, compete vigorously with each other for issuer and
product listings, trading volume in multiple listed securities, market data
revenues, and new member organizations (among other things). Delays in
introducing new rules or trading systems directly burden that competition.
Moreover, Commission review of all SRO filings, even those that are truly
non-controversial, is an enormous drain on staff resources that could be
better deployed in processing more significant filings and doing the leg
work necessary for rulemaking.158
The SEC should take several actions. First, it should dust off and
extend, its former proposed Rule 19b-6159 so that fewer SRO rule filings
would get full pre-effective reviews. The Exchange Act invites this in
section 19(b)(3)(A), and the Commission should use this statutory authority
to reduce procedural barriers to competition. Many elements of the 19b-6
proposal were sound, including the elimination of pre-filing submissions
and pre-effective periods for “non-controversial” filings, and permitting

158. See generally SEC OPERATIONS, supra note 18, at 14–16.
159. See Rule Changes by Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 43,860,

66 Fed. Reg. 8912 (proposed Feb. 5, 2001). See also supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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certain trading rule changes to be effective on filing.160 Beyond this, the
SEC should give more definition and be liberal about which rule filings are
eligible for the “systems change” category.161 Moreover, now that most
exchanges are demutualized and members are less involved in exchange
governance than in the past, a more expansive view of which changes to an
exchange’s governance structure and governing documents should be
eligible for effective on filing treatment (or should be excluded from the
definition of “rule” and “proposed rule change” under the Exchange Act
and Rule 19b-4 altogether). There is little risk that anticompetitive or
discriminatory rule proposals will find their way into the permanent
structure of the markets, since the Commission retains the power to
summarily abrogate rule filings that are effective upon filing.162 If
necessary, the SEC could recommend that Congress extend the period
during which it could summarily abrogate rule filings as a trade-off for
expansion of effective upon filing treatment.163
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
See Exchange Act Rule 19b-4(f)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(f)(5) (2006).
See Exchange Act § 19(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2000).
One concern that is latent in the expansion of “effective upon filing” treatment is the extent
to which SROs may assume that proposed rule changes which become effective under
section 19(b)(3)(A) enjoy the benefits of preemption from state law and immunity from antitrust
challenge under the doctrine of implied repeal, since there is no Commission order approving such
rule changes. This uncertainty stems in part from the language of the statute, which provides that a
rule change filed pursuant to section 19(b)(3)(A) becomes effective immediately and may be
enforced by the SRO “to the extent it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the
rules and regulations thereunder, and applicable Federal and State law.” See Exchange Act §
19(b)(3)(C). With regard to antitrust immunity, in its proposing release for Rule 19b-6, the SEC
stated:
Subsection (h) of Rule 19b-6 clarifies that where a proposed rule change becomes
effective upon filing pursuant to section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act, no inference may be
made regarding whether the proposed rule change is in the public interest, including
whether it has an impact on competition. Although the Commission intends to conduct
a review of proposed rule changes that are effective on filing in order to determine
whether they raise significant issues requiring abrogation of the filing, the Commission
will not be taking final action unless it chooses to abrogate the proposed rule change
and subsequently issues an order approving or disapproving the proposal pursuant to
section 19(b)(2) of the Act. Therefore, the Commission will not necessarily have made
a final determination on whether the proposed rule change is in the public interest,
including whether it has an impact on competition, where the proposal has become
effective upon filing pursuant to section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Exchange Act. Absent a
Commission order approving the proposed SRO rule change pursuant to section
19(b)(2), a person may not necessarily draw conclusions about whether the proposed
rule change is in the public interest, including whether it has an impact on competition.
Rule Changes by Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 43,860, 66 Fed. Reg.
8912, 8917 (proposed Feb. 5, 2001). Because many SRO rules directly or indirectly authorize
joint action among members, the absence of clear antitrust immunity could be a significant
stumbling block. See Letter from Meyer S. Frucher, Chairman and CEO, Philadelphia Stock
Exch., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 6, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/ s70301/frucher1.htm (concerning proposed Rule 19b-6).
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Second, the staff should curtail its current practice of reviewing each
filing that is made pursuant to section 19(b)(3)(A) and holding over the
SROs the threat of rejecting filings as incomplete or defective if the SRO
implements the rule change.164 The staff should allow the filings to become
effective and use their power to abrogate more liberally. In that way, the
true effects of the filing can be observed, and any required amendments can
be made on a post-effective basis.
Third, with respect to those rule filings that truly raise competitive
implications, the staff should include in the approval orders a detailed
analysis of competitive effects and policy justification for competitive
impacts that are determined to exist. It is doubtful that any one model of
competition analysis is “the right one.” However, it is certain that if the
SEC adopts a different standard and approach to competition analysis in
each of its official actions (or merely, as it does in the case of most SRO
rule filing approvals, recites that it does not view the filing as having an
adverse impact on competition), virtually any result can be justified.165 A
more detailed analysis would permit market participants to analyze
prospectively how the Commission is likely to view the competitive impact
of a given proposal while it is in the formulation stage. It would also, where
appropriate, facilitate appeals.

There is a similar concern with preemptive effects on state law. See Credit Suisse First
Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1132 n.18 (9th Cir. 2005) (leaving open the question of
whether SRO rules that have become effective upon filing under section 19(b)(3)(A) of the
Exchange Act pre-empt inconsistent state law); Brief for the SEC, NASD Dispute Resolution v.
Judicial Counsel of Cal., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1055 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C 02 3486 SBA),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/nasddispute.htm.
However, to the extent that SROs are concerned about preemption and antitrust issues,
they always have the option to submit a filing under section 19(b)(1), (2) and obtain a
Commission order approving the filing. See Exchange Act § 19(b)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1),
(2) (2000).
164. Naturally, there is some risk that an SRO rule change actually is technically or
substantively defective. See, e.g., Filings by Self-Regulatory Organizations of Proposed Rule
Changes and Other Materials with the Commission, Exchange Act Release 15,838, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,924 (May 29, 1979) (containing a discussion of defective filings). However, a fatally defective
filing that was inconsistent with the Act and the SEC’s rules presumably could not be enforced by
the SRO in any event.
165. This suggestion is not meant to suggest that a more coherent and explicit approach to
competition analysis in its SRO rule filing approval order would make them more susceptible to
court challenge. The standards that the SEC is charged with implementing are very general, and
courts are extremely deferential to expert regulatory bodies, such as the SEC, in their analysis of
the types of complex and technical issues that arise in such contexts as securities market
competition. See, e.g., Domestic Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 333 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also
Oesterle, supra note 11, at 3.
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C. ESTABLISH BY REGULATION (OR REQUEST THAT CONGRESS,
THROUGH AN AMENDMENT TO SECTION 19 OF THE EXCHANGE
ACT) A TIME LIMIT FOR PUBLISHING SRO RULE FILINGS FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT
Although this will no doubt result in more actions to disapprove filings
(which would be a regrettable burden on staff resources), there is no better
way to improve the pace and transparency of the process overall. This
proposal would eliminate the possibility of significant SRO actions which
could promote competition from being stalled at the staff level, thereby
acting as a barrier to new entrants to challenge the status quo, while the
staff considers the filing. It would also force out earlier in the process the
full range of comment by interested parties.
D. LIBERALIZE THE USE OF NO-ACTION AND EXEMPTIVE RELIEF IN
AREAS WITH A COMPETITIVE IMPACT, INCLUDING NEW
PRODUCTS AND PROPOSALS—PERHAPS USING MORE READILY
“GENERIC” NO-ACTION LETTERS AND TEMPORARY OR PILOT
APPROVALS TO ENABLE THE COMMISSION STAFF TO STUDY
THE IMPACT OF THE APPROVALS
The rulemaking process is too blunt an instrument to capture all of the
permutations and variations in businesses being regulated, and to adapt to
unforeseen changes in technology and business methods. No-action letters,
temporary rules and pilot programs are “escape valves” to permit legitimate
activities that do not contravene the law or the spirit of regulation and are
meant to be used. They do not commit the SEC to being stuck indefinitely
with bad decisions.166 If the principal constraint on these procedural
vehicles is staffing, then the Commission should make it a priority to
increase staffing for this purpose.167 Perhaps a statement of policy by the
Commission, giving direction to the Division Directors and the staff, would
encourage the staff to be bolder in recommending or granting relief.

166. No-action letters also can be granted on a temporary basis. See, e.g., REDI System, SEC
No-Action Letter, 2002 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 444 (Mar. 29, 2002). They may also be withdrawn if
facts or Commission policies change. See, e.g., Domestic Securities, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 756 (Oct. 21, 2005); Dominion Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 304 (Mar. 7, 2000).
167. See SEC OPERATIONS, supra note 18, at 14–16.
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E. RECOGNIZING THAT MARKETS ARE INCREASINGLY
INTERNATIONAL, EXPLICITLY SEEK TO PERMIT CROSS-BORDER
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (OR CONSIDER REQUESTING
CONGRESS TO ADD TO THE STATUTORY FACTORS THAT THE
SEC SHOULD CONSIDER IN RULEMAKING AND OTHER OFFICIAL
ACTION)
The SEC lacks a comprehensive framework for balancing international
issues, including the competitive position of U.S. financial institutions and
U.S. investor access to foreign markets and products, against other policy
issues. As a result, such issues are given relatively little weight.
International competitiveness and freedom of access should be considered
as a matter of course when developing rulemaking and taking other official
actions. Perhaps this can only be effected on a systematic basis by
amending the Exchange Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Exchange Act provides an appropriate mechanism for
balancing the roles of the SEC and competitive forces in developing market
structure in the context of formal SEC actions, such as rulemaking, there
are several respects in which the system of regulation established under the
Exchange Act operates in practice to burden competition unnecessarily. If
the modest procedural reforms described in this article are adopted they
should promote the general goals of the Exchange Act to alleviate a number
of constraints on competition and innovation without compromising the
Exchange Act’s other policy objectives.

